Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification - Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification

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The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists to conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party verification that...

Source: Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification

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Field	Value
Data last updated	November 12, 2024
Metadata last updated	August 20, 2025
Created	November 12, 2024
Format	PDF
License	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
Datastore active	False
Datastore contains all records of source file	False
Has views	True
Id	f1eb92e3-7983-49c3-965e-7e57e49f3abc
Mimetype	application/pdf
Name translated	{'en': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'km': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'lo': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'my_MM': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'vi': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification'}
Package id	b0371c58-60b3-4c27-b148-98e54c8c9ec2
Position	0
Resource description	{'en': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'km': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'lo': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'my_MM': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'vi': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.'}
Size	1.5 MiB
State	active
Url type	upload
Name	Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification
Description	The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists to conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party verification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers of credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in previous research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’ motivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of certification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence good and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the producer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important effects on certification-based regulation.

Field

Value

Data last updated

November 12, 2024

Metadata last updated

August 20, 2025

Created

November 12, 2024

Format

PDF

License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0

Datastore active

False

Datastore contains all records of source file

False

Has views

True

f1eb92e3-7983-49c3-965e-7e57e49f3abc

Mimetype

application/pdf

Name translated

{'en': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'km': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'lo': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'my_MM': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'vi': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification'}

Package id

b0371c58-60b3-4c27-b148-98e54c8c9ec2

Position

Resource description

{'en': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'km': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'lo': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'my_MM': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'vi': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.'}

Size

1.5 MiB

State

active

Url type

upload

Name

Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification

Description

The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists to conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party verification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers of credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in previous research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’ motivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of certification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence good and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the producer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important effects on certification-based regulation.

Lending credence: motivation, trust, and...

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