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နောက်ဆုံး ပြင်ဆင်ခဲ့သော ဒေတာ 2024- နိုဝင်ဘာ 12
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Name translated{'en': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'km': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'lo': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'my_MM': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification', 'vi': 'Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification'}
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Resource description{'en': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'km': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'lo': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'my_MM': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.', 'vi': 'The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists\r\nto conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party\r\nverification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers\r\nof credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in\r\nprevious research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’\r\nmotivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of\r\ncertification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence\r\ngood and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the\r\nproducer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important\r\neffects on certification-based regulation.'}
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နာမည် Lending credence: motivation, trust, and organic certification
ဖော်ပြချက်

The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists to conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party verification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers of credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in previous research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers’ motivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of certification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence good and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the producer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important effects on certification-based regulation.